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Resolving relations with Kosovo is a key obstacle to Serbia
joining the EU.
by Blog Admin
Serbia was awarded EU candidacy status at the beginning of this year. Jelena Obradovic-
Wochnik and Alexander Wochnik write that while recognition of Kosovo’s independence
is not a formal requirement for Serbia’s membership of the EU, the ruling Serbian Renewal
Party has used the Kosovo issue as a way to gain support among the country’s conservative
voters. It may be a difficult to task to balance Serbia’s EU ambitions against its commitment
to Kosovo.
When Tomislav Nikolic, leader of  the conservative Serbian Renewal Party (SNS), was
elected as president in May 2012, reaction f rom global media and opinion leaders was
one of  alarm. Headlines seemed to suggest that Nikolic would return the Balkans to an
era of  nationalism and strif e. Specif ically, the results of  the presidential and parliamentary
elections – in which the SNS f ormed a coalit ion with smaller conservative parties – did
not seem to bode well f or the resolution of  Serbia’s Kosovo deadlock and its progress
towards EU membership. 
Even though Serbia had been awarded EU candidacy just bef ore the May 2012 elections, the key
priorit ies of  the SNS, as listed in their party programme, indicate that this particular government may not
make much progress towards normalising relations with Kosovo, and obtaining EU membership. As its
key priorit ies, the party lists among others, ‘maintenance of  territorial sovereignty’ (i.e. non-recognition
of  Kosovo independence), assisting Serbs outside of  Serbian borders, a strong state and stronger
relations with Russia and China. Importantly, the programme does not oppose Serbia’s EU membership,
but advises it will take place only if  Serbia enters as a ‘whole state’ together with Kosovo.
Kosovo and the EU have dominated Serbia’s f oreign policy
agenda since the f all of  the undemocratic Slobodan
Milosevic regime in 2000. The pair, as we wrote in a recent
article, have been stitched together into an either/or issue by
the Serbian polit ical leadership, rather than by the EU itself .
The EU, where f ive member states – Greece, Spain, Cyrprus,
Romania and Slovakia – do not recognise Kosovo’s
independence, never made recognition of  Kosovo’s
independence a condition f or Serbian membership. The EU
does, however, demand ‘good neighbourly relations’ and a
normalisation of  the Serbia-Kosovo relationship. But, many
key polit ical leaders in Serbia, including Nikolic, have made
public statements that give an impression that EU
membership is directly dependent on recognition. For
instance, in a recent interview, Nikolic stated: ‘If  they give us
an of f icial condition, Europe or Kosovo, we will give up the
European path’. Despite the regime change in Serbia, the
policy and discourse on Kosovo remains the same. Change
of  this policy was dif f icult even f or the f ar more democratic
and pro-EU Boris Tadic, and seems virtually impossible now
that Nikolic and the SNS are in power.
An important dimension to the Serbia-Kosovo-EU triangle, is
that this is a way f or Nikolic to (re)gain polit ical legit imacy, particularly amongst Kosovo Serbs and the
more conservative voters. If  we take a closer look at the presidential and parliamentary elections of
2012, two things are clear – that Nikolic won by a small margin in the second round, and his ‘Let’s get
Serbia Moving’ coalit ion won only 24 per cent of  the popular vote. Nikolic and the SNS party won the
most seats in rural areas, but also in Northern Kosovo, where Serbs vote in Serbian elections (deemed
unlawf ul by the Kosovo government). In f act, Northern Kosovo is one of  the very f ew places in which
Nikolic and the SNS are wildly more popular than Tadic and the Democrats. Serbs in North Kosovo, as
Nikolic knows, f eel isolated, and many do not wish to be a part of  Kosovo, as they recently indicated in a
locally-organised ref erendum (in which 99 per cent of  the eligible voters declared that they do not
recognise the authority of  Kosovo). Kosovo Serbs do not f orm a large block of  voters, but they are a
convenient polit ical cause f or the SNS to take on. Moreover, issues of  Kosovo and Kosovo Serbs are
more resonant in rural, smaller- town Serbia – the core support base of  SNS – where EU membership is
perhaps a bit more abstract than in urban Belgrade. This is the crux of  the issue: how f ar will Nikolic go
to maintain his support amongst Kosovo Serbs – as well as the more tradit ionally or conservatively
minded electorate?
Importantly, what does this mean f or Serbia’s accession f rom the EU’s perspective? In general, the
climate f or EU widening is not f avourable. The economic and f inancial crises have instead put the
emphasis on EU deepening. In most member states it is dif f icult to sell to the public the idea of  more
member states that would tap Brussels’ structural and cohesion f unds at t imes when the southern euro
periphery states need to be bailed out or austerity measures agreed on. Under Merkel, the most
important member state, Germany, has not been enthusiastic about f urther enlargement.
When Merkel visited Serbia last year, she crit icised f ormer President Boris Tadic f or supporting ‘parallel’
structures in Kosovo – a system of  public services and administration operating in North Kosovo, and
f unded by Serbia.   Merkel advised that a Serbia-Kosovo dialogue is expected, reminding Serbia of
Germany’s recognition of  Kosovo’s independence. Since the EU does not have a joint posit ion on the
recognition of  Kosovo, huge emphasis is placed on the success of  the bi- lateral talks which are aimed at
easing technical cooperation and movement of  people between Kosovo and Serbia. 
Those negotiations commenced during the Tadic administration and af ter several rounds of  talks some
progress was made on issues such as civil registry, car licence places and recognition of  university
diplomas. The talks, aimed at technical issues, and specif ically avoiding questions of  status, are
intended to normalise relations in such a way that they can f acilitate cooperation and movement of
people between Kosovo and Serbia, and hence contribute towards good neighbourly relations. The
negotiations, however, are somewhat downplayed by the Nikolic administration, which has just entered
their f irst round of  talks. For instance, the Minister f or EU Integration, Suzana Grubjesic recently stated
that the upcoming round of  talks is ‘only the beginning’ and one should ‘expect nothing special’.  
Normalising Serbia-Kosovo relations may be one of  the reasons that the Council approved Serbia’s
candidacy status in March 2012. It may have also been a bid to help Tadic’s re-election, and to boost
conf idence in the EU amongst the Serbian population. What emerged instead was a new government
which promises f urther Serbia-Kosovo deadlock, and may pose serious challenges to f urther
cooperation and a smooth transit ion towards membership. If  this is the case, perhaps the EU needs a
new plan: it will be a dif f icult task to balance Serbia’s EU ambitions against required ref orms and its
commitment to Kosovo.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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